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Correspondent banking 1 NOW Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 Sent Correspondent banking is one of the most heavily controlled areas in finance Step 1 of 5 Correspondent banking 1 NOW Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 Sent Correspondent banking is one of the most heavily controlled areas in finance Step 1 of 5
Payment mentions a sanctioned person 1 Correspondent banking 2 NOW Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 Sent If a payment mentions a sanctioned person Step 2 of 5 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 1 Correspondent banking 2 NOW Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 Sent If a payment mentions a sanctioned person Step 2 of 5
Respondent ownership information 1 Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 NOW Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 Sent The correspondent will ask for information about the respondent's ownership Step 3 of 5 Respondent ownership information 1 Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 NOW Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 Sent The correspondent will ask for information about the respondent's ownership Step 3 of 5
Compliance means that the payment 1 Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 NOW Compliance 5 Sent For the payment itself, compliance means that the payment message must carry enough information for the correspondent and the intermediary banks to screen it. Step 4 of 5 Compliance means that the payment 1 Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 NOW Compliance 5 Sent For the payment itself, compliance means that the payment message must carry enough information for the correspondent and the intermediary banks to screen it. Step 4 of 5
Analyst: sent 1 Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 NOW Sent The analyst must design the payment capture screen to collect the full originator and beneficiary information Step 5 of 5 Analyst: sent 1 Correspondent banking 2 Payment mentions a sanctioned person 3 Respondent ownership information 4 Compliance 5 NOW Sent The analyst must design the payment capture screen to collect the full originator and beneficiary information Step 5 of 5

Flow of the explanation in this lesson.

0:00 / 2:18 Step 1 of 5

Compliance, sanctions and de-risking

Correspondent Banking and Nostro Vostro, Lesson 7 of 8, Narration 2:18, D06 Cross-border payments

Correspondent bankingCaptureReject

What you will learn

Your objective. By the end of this lesson, you will be able to explain compliance, sanctions and de-risking. Correspondent banking is one of the most heavily controlled areas in finance, because a correspondent account can be used to move money for money laundering, for terrorist financing, or for evading sanctions, and the.

Why it matters. If a payment mentions a sanctioned person, a sanctioned country or a sanctioned entity, it is stopped, and the correspondent bank must decide whether to reject it, to block it, or to report it.

Chapter objective: Learner explains correspondent banking, including nostro and vostro accounts, account funding, and the chain of banks in a cross-border payment, and calculates the funding impact of a payment. Learner applies this skill in realistic banking scenarios, with clear examples and correct terminology throughout.

Key learning points

  • Correspondent banking
  • Payment mentions a sanctioned person
  • Respondent ownership information
  • Compliance means that the payment
  • Analyst: sent

Key terms

Correspondent banking: A service where one bank holds accounts for another bank so the second bank can make payments in currencies or countries where it has no branch.

Capture: The step in a card transaction where the merchant collects the authorised amount from the issuer, usually when goods are shipped.

Reject: A payment instruction that is refused before settlement because it fails validation, screening or account checks.

Correspondent banking diagram showing Compliance, sanctions and de-risking.

Practise this lesson

Exercise

Decide what the screening or monitoring outcome should be for the scenario in this lesson.

Use the lists, rules and thresholds in this lesson.

  1. What to do. State whether the payment is stopped, held, frozen or released, and what must be recorded for audit.

Correct result. A true match against a sanctions list stops the payment. A false positive is cleared with a reason recorded. An alert that is escalated becomes a case, and a case that meets the threshold becomes a suspicious activity report.

Why. Screening is a control, not a suggestion. A missed true match is a regulatory breach, and an unexplained clearance is an audit finding.

Check your understanding

Practice question

Which of the following best describes compliance, sanctions and de-risking?

Takeaway and next step

What to remember

A payment that loses its originator information on the way is a payment that will be stopped, and the customer will ask why a payment that was sent on Monday has still not arrived on Friday.

Build a cross-border payment like the one in this lesson and watch the chain, the charges, and the final amount change.

Open the Cross-Border Payment Configurator →

Builds on "Nostro reconciliation and account statements".

Transcript and full text

Show transcript

Correspondent banking is one of the most heavily controlled areas in finance, because a correspondent account can be used to move money for money laundering, for terrorist financing, or for evading sanctions, and the correspondent bank is responsible for checking the payments that pass through its account. Every payment that goes through a correspondent account is screened against sanctions lists, including the lists maintained by the United Nations, the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control, the European Union and the United Kingdom. If a payment mentions a sanctioned person, a sanctioned country or a sanctioned entity, it is stopped, and the correspondent bank must decide whether to reject it, to block it, or to report it. The difference between a reject and a block matters, and the analyst must get it right. A reject means the payment is returned to the sender and the funds are not moved, usually because of a sanctions hit that turns out to be a false positive or a policy decision by the bank. A block means the funds are frozen in place, the payment is not returned, and the bank must report the block to its regulator, in the United States to OFAC, and must hold the funds until it receives permission to release them. A blocked payment can sit for months or years. The system must therefore distinguish a reject from a block, must record which authority was notified, and must prevent any user from releasing a blocked payment without the required approval. The correspondent bank also has to know its respondent bank, a process known as know your customer for banks, and it must understand the respondent's customers, its business, its controls and its risk profile. The correspondent will ask for the Wolfsberg Correspondent Banking Due Diligence Questionnaire, audited financials, licences, ownership structure, anti money laundering policies, transaction volumes and customer base, and it will review this information every year. If the correspondent is not satisfied, it can restrict the account, raise the fees, or close the relationship. The cost of knowing the customer and screening the payments has made some relationships unprofitable, and the correspondent has chosen to exit rather than to take the risk. Nested correspondent banking is the highest risk variant, and it deserves its own attention. When a respondent bank processes payments for its own respondent banks, the correspondent at the top of the chain is exposed to customers it has never seen and cannot identify. The Wolfsberg Group's guidance requires the intermediary bank to understand the nested bank's business, to apply risk based controls, and to be able to identify the underlying originator when asked. A correspondent that discovers its respondent is offering nested services without disclosure may close the account immediately. The analyst must therefore ask, for every respondent relationship, whether nested activity is permitted, whether it is disclosed, and what controls apply. For the payment itself, compliance means that the payment message must carry enough information for the correspondent and the intermediary banks to screen it. The message must identify the originator with a name, an account number and an address, and it must identify the beneficiary with a name and an account number. This is the travel rule, FATF Recommendation 16, and it applies to every cross border payment. A payment with missing or vague information will be stopped for a query, and the query will delay the payment by days. In ISO 20022 the originator information is carried in the Dbtr and DbtrAcct elements of the pacs.008, and the beneficiary in the Cdtr and CdtrAcct elements, and the system must validate that they are populated before the payment is released. Screening itself is a system with its own design. Every payment is checked against sanctions lists, against the bank's internal watchlists, and against transaction monitoring rules that look for unusual patterns, such as round amounts, rapid movement of funds, or payments to high risk countries. A hit produces an alert, and the alert goes to a compliance queue where an analyst reviews it and decides to release, reject or escalate. The payment is held while the alert is open, which means the screening system is on the critical path for every payment, and a slow screening system is a slow payment product. The analyst must specify the screening rules, the queueing, the service level for clearing alerts, and the audit trail, because a payment released without screening is a regulatory breach. When a large correspondent closes accounts in a small country, the banks in that country lose access to dollars or euros, their customers cannot pay for imports, and remittances become slower and more expensive. Regulators and the Financial Stability Board have pressed correspondent banks to take a risk based approach rather than a wholesale exit, and to use the information in the Wolfsberg questionnaire to differentiate between high risk and low risk respondents. The analyst who works on a corridor that has lost a correspondent should document the impact, escalate it, and explore alternatives, including regional clearing, payment system linkages, and fintech networks, because losing a correspondent is a business continuity event, not just an operations problem. A practical compliance checklist for the analyst: does the payment capture screen collect the full originator name, account and address, and the full beneficiary name and account. Does the system validate the BIC against the SWIFT directory and the IBAN with the MOD 97 check before release. Does every payment carry a UETR so it can be traced. Does the screening engine check the payment before it leaves the bank, and does it log the result. Does the exception queue distinguish a reject from a block, and does it prevent a blocked payment from being released without approval. If the answer to any of these is no, the product has a compliance gap, and the analyst should raise it before the product goes live, because fixing it after a regulator finds it is far more expensive.

Correspondent banking is one of the most heavily controlled areas in finance, because a correspondent account can be used to move money for money laundering, for terrorist financing, or for evading sanctions, and the correspondent bank is responsible for checking the payments that pass through its account. Every payment that goes through a correspondent account is screened against sanctions lists, including the lists maintained by the United Nations, the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control, the European Union and the United Kingdom. If a payment mentions a sanctioned person, a sanctioned country or a sanctioned entity, it is stopped, and the correspondent bank must decide whether to reject it, to block it, or to report it.

The difference between a reject and a block matters, and the analyst must get it right. A reject means the payment is returned to the sender and the funds are not moved, usually because of a sanctions hit that turns out to be a false positive or a policy decision by the bank. A block means the funds are frozen in place, the payment is not returned, and the bank must report the block to its regulator, in the United States to OFAC, and must hold the funds until it receives permission to release them. A blocked payment can sit for months or years. The system must therefore distinguish a reject from a block, must record which authority was notified, and must prevent any user from releasing a blocked payment without the required approval.

The correspondent bank also has to know its respondent bank, a process known as know your customer for banks, and it must understand the respondent's customers, its business, its controls and its risk profile. The correspondent will ask for the Wolfsberg Correspondent Banking Due Diligence Questionnaire, audited financials, licences, ownership structure, anti money laundering policies, transaction volumes and customer base, and it will review this information every year. If the correspondent is not satisfied, it can restrict the account, raise the fees, or close the relationship. The cost of knowing the customer and screening the payments has made some relationships unprofitable, and the correspondent has chosen to exit rather than to take the risk.

Nested correspondent banking is the highest risk variant, and it deserves its own attention. When a respondent bank processes payments for its own respondent banks, the correspondent at the top of the chain is exposed to customers it has never seen and cannot identify. The Wolfsberg Group's guidance requires the intermediary bank to understand the nested bank's business, to apply risk based controls, and to be able to identify the underlying originator when asked. A correspondent that discovers its respondent is offering nested services without disclosure may close the account immediately. The analyst must therefore ask, for every respondent relationship, whether nested activity is permitted, whether it is disclosed, and what controls apply.

For the payment itself, compliance means that the payment message must carry enough information for the correspondent and the intermediary banks to screen it. The message must identify the originator with a name, an account number and an address, and it must identify the beneficiary with a name and an account number. This is the travel rule, FATF Recommendation 16, and it applies to every cross border payment. A payment with missing or vague information will be stopped for a query, and the query will delay the payment by days. In ISO 20022 the originator information is carried in the Dbtr and DbtrAcct elements of the pacs.008, and the beneficiary in the Cdtr and CdtrAcct elements, and the system must validate that they are populated before the payment is released.

Screening itself is a system with its own design. Every payment is checked against sanctions lists, against the bank's internal watchlists, and against transaction monitoring rules that look for unusual patterns, such as round amounts, rapid movement of funds, or payments to high risk countries. A hit produces an alert, and the alert goes to a compliance queue where an analyst reviews it and decides to release, reject or escalate. The payment is held while the alert is open, which means the screening system is on the critical path for every payment, and a slow screening system is a slow payment product. The analyst must specify the screening rules, the queueing, the service level for clearing alerts, and the audit trail, because a payment released without screening is a regulatory breach.

When a large correspondent closes accounts in a small country, the banks in that country lose access to dollars or euros, their customers cannot pay for imports, and remittances become slower and more expensive. Regulators and the Financial Stability Board have pressed correspondent banks to take a risk based approach rather than a wholesale exit, and to use the information in the Wolfsberg questionnaire to differentiate between high risk and low risk respondents. The analyst who works on a corridor that has lost a correspondent should document the impact, escalate it, and explore alternatives, including regional clearing, payment system linkages, and fintech networks, because losing a correspondent is a business continuity event, not just an operations problem.

A practical compliance checklist for the analyst: does the payment capture screen collect the full originator name, account and address, and the full beneficiary name and account. Does the system validate the BIC against the SWIFT directory and the IBAN with the MOD 97 check before release. Does every payment carry a UETR so it can be traced. Does the screening engine check the payment before it leaves the bank, and does it log the result. Does the exception queue distinguish a reject from a block, and does it prevent a blocked payment from being released without approval. If the answer to any of these is no, the product has a compliance gap, and the analyst should raise it before the product goes live, because fixing it after a regulator finds it is far more expensive.

Full lesson text (all scenes)

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